In 1670, in Bushell's Case, Vaughan CJ held that jurors could not be punished for acquitting in the face of a judicial instruction to convict.
14 At a time of severe governmental hostility towards religious dissent (particularly regarding those, like the Quakers, whose theology would not permit them to swear an oath), a jury refused to convict two Quaker leaders for an unlawful religious assembly. 15 The jurors were imprisoned for their failure to convict, but were eventually able to persuade the Court of Common Pleas to order their release, with Vaughan CJ famously holding that their imprisonment had been unlawful. But Juror punishment, it should be noted, was only partially prohibited. This fact was easily lost, however, amid the energetic debate which followed Vaughan's decision. 16 In dialogues like Hawles' in 1680, 17 much was made of the 'qualified impossibility' 18 of juror punishment: that judicial browbeating might happen, but was legally insignificant. Stern, in particular, has shown how this debate can be traced through at least a century of Anglo-American politics. 19 But the fact the discussion after 1670 shifted towards the legitimacy of jury power has had the consequence of downplaying the subsequent history of juror punishment. In fact, Vaughan's judgment did not outlaw juror punishment in its entirety; but this fact has generally been overlooked, and as a result the history of juror punishment after 1670 has not yet been written. But given recent moves in certain common-law countries towards a regularisation of juror punishment, 20 this history must be taken seriously. This article adds to the debate regarding the propriety and Case, noting that 'the judges retained the power to fine jurors for misbehavior'. 22 Langbein gave as an example a 1680 report from the Old Bailey, where a man was tried for the theft of a watch. Both the judge and all but one of the jury thought there was 'very convincing
Evidence' and, when the judge questioned the juror, he explained that 'he was not satisfied in his Conscience; for the watch might be found with the man, and yet he not steal it'. The other jurors, however, explained that their dissentient had earlier expressed annoyance with having been made to serve, and had declared 'If I must be on [the jury], I'll cross, or plague them'.
The juror denied the charge, but the Court was convinced of his guilt and summarily fined him 21 On the recent debate generally, see ibid, paras 4.36-4.37. Questions of juror misconduct have, in their most dramatic forms, been long associated with practices of 'jury nullification' or of 'jury equity', and this political dimension in jury trial has not only been an English story. Nineteenth-century French juries, for example, were notorious for acquitting against the evidence, as were Irish juries throughout the nineteenth century and, during the second half of the twentieth century in particular, there were similar concerns regarding juries in Northern Ireland. But while a comparative discussion exploring the relationship between nullification and punishment in these jurisdictions would doubtless be a fruitful way of furthering the current debate regarding juror misconduct and punishment, such a discussion would be well beyond the scope of this article. On jury 'equity' and 'nullifcation', see generally Green, above n 16, and P Butler, fifty pounds. 23 Before the 2015 Act changed the law on juror punishment, most jurors punished for misconduct seem to have been dealt with in this summary way. 24 Following the changes in juror punishment brought about by the Criminal Justice and Courts
Act 2015, such misconduct is no longer to be tried summarily as contempt. Given the publicity of the recent trials outlined above, the judiciary, the Law Commission and the government all concluded that jurors had to be given the procedural protections of a Crown Court trial before they could be fined or imprisoned. 25 In some ways, this makes the history of juror punishment after 1670 irrelevant: the procedure used to discipline criminal trial jurors for the past threeand-a-half centuries has now been replaced by a new series of indictable offences. This article argues, however, that the growing importance of juror punishment makes it particularly important to gain a solid understanding of how such punishment has functioned in the period between Bushell's Case and today.
This article does not seek to draw a sharp distinction between civil and criminal juries. For much of the period under discussion, the primary statute governing qualification for jury service was the Juries Act 1825, which did not draw a distinction between the two. 26 While the nineteenth century saw a steady decline in the use of civil juries, the law in the books generally treated the two institutions as broadly equivalent to one another. The major doctrinal difference between the punishment of civil and criminal jurors was that the attaint -which, like the new provisions under the 2015 Act, subjected jurors suspected of bringing in a false verdict to a jury trial -does not seem to have applied to criminal jurors. This article is concerned with the 23 Unnamed defendant, 26 May 1680, OBP, t16800526-1. 24 period after the 1825 abolition of the attaint, however, at which point the law of juror punishment applied equally to both types of petit jury. A major difference between the two systems regarding alternatives to punishment was the fact that, in a civil case, a verdict deemed to be against the evidence could be replaced with a second verdict from a new jury. 27 In this way the attaint's corrective role was retained beyond 1825, and so it is possible that some judges might have been inclined to treat civil jurors more leniently than their colleagues in the criminal courts, whose faulty verdicts could not be so easily corrected. It has not been possible, however, to conclusively state on the basis of the surviving evidence whether, and if so to what extent, this actually resulted in civil and criminal juries being treated differently.
The focus here is not on the records kept at local archives throughout England and Wales, but rather on those kept at the National Archives in Kew, with support where appropriate from the local newspaper reports available via the British Newspaper Archive. The reason for proceeding in this way is twofold. First, given the recent move towards a consistent, centralised approach to juror misconduct and punishment, it is important to understand how such misconduct has previously been addressed and experienced by government. Second, given that juror punishment has not traditionally been regarded as a very important problem, many records have not survived, and those that have are not bundled together in large files. Given the difficulty of pulling together surviving archival evidence, this article primarily focuses on centrally-held records. This has enabled the development of a significant new analysis which could in future be used as a starting-point for exploring local responses to juror misconduct.
This analysis shows that the files at the National Archives can best be understood by reading them in the context of a conceptual distinction set out in Bushell's Case itself. This distinction 27 See, eg, WR Cornish, The Jury (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1968) pp 117-119.
-between "ministerial" and "judicial" functions -originated in England but has subsequently been exported to other common-law jurisdictions. It is to this distinction that this article now turns.
The terminology of juror punishment: 'ministerial' and 'judicial' offences
In this first substantive section, I will set out a framework for understanding the post-1825
instances of juror punishment which will be explored below. Given that such punishment has only recently become a major governmental concern, it is not surprising that the task of categorising particular types of punishment or misconduct has not yet been completed. While some important juror-related issues, such as the position of women after 1919, have been collated at the National Archives into convenient bundles, 28 evidence of juror punishment has to be collected from individual records which have often been destroyed. 29 It is difficult to find evidence of juror punishment, and it is equally difficult to find discussions of the concepts involved. This may well be a product of Restoration pamphleteers' success in popularising the idea that Bushell's Case meant jurors were immune to punishment. If so, the best place to look for a well thought-out idea of the conceptual bases of juror punishment may well be the period in which these pamphleteers were writing, when it was still considered an issue suitable for serious political contestation. But first, it will be important to briefly explain what charges an errant juror might find herself facing. 28 There are two large bundles on women and jury service held at the National Archives: National Archives HO and is still used in some American administrative law today. 58 Vaughan's use of the distinction was unusual in acting as a criterion for determining the legitimacy of juror punishment; but it was not expanded upon beyond the passage quoted above. Understanding this distinction is essential, however, both for understanding Vaughan's judgment and for situating the 2015 reforms in a critical, historical context, one which will raise serious doubts about their practicality. 55 Bushell's Case, above n 14, 1014. It should be noted that Vaughan's list here is very similar to Duncombe's penultimate chapter on juror misconduct: Duncombe, above n 34, pp 210-223. 56 Ibid, p 1014. 57 See below, nn 59-66. 58 Ministerial officials were understood to lack discretion. Nonetheless, they did occasionally have greater freedom of action than those acting judicially, as in Mackalley's case, where a Sunday arrest (arrest being a ministerial activity) was deemed lawful, even though Sundays were not dies juridicus. 59 The fact judicial activities were impermissible on the Sabbath did not preclude ministerial tasks relating to a criminal trial, for example, from being carried out. In one case, the judges of King's Bench were asked to consider the legality of a proceeding which would reduce a judge to a mere minister of the City of London, applying a certificate from the mayor and aldermen regarding customary duties at the city's docks and wharves rather than submitting the question to a jury trial. The mayor and aldermen claimed to have statutory authorisation for the procedure; but the judges were keen to circumvent it, noting that even if 'the custom of certificate … is confirmed by Parliament … even an Act of Parliament, made against natural equity, as to make a man Judge in his own case, is void in it self'. 60 Ministerial actions are automatic processes, and as such lack the due process guarantees of judicial determinations.
Vaughan's position was not that a juror was a judicial officer and therefore immune to punishment; rather, jurors were immune to punishment only when they were acting in their judicial capacity. And the jury was not alone in being assigned this split office. Modern practices of juror punishment, then, should not simply be classified in doctrinal terms.
Given that until 2015 most juror misconduct could be characterised as contempt, and given the government's desire to eradicate contempt as the ordinary mechanism for punishing jurors who have, for example, used Facebook to contact a defendant, any analysis which centres on the purely doctrinal question of the offence which misbehaving jurors historically faced will be particularly unhelpful today. An analysis which considers juror misconduct in terms of the juror's split function -half-ministerial, half-judicial -is a more promising way of understanding the recent history of juror punishment, as this classification reaches past the boundaries of doctrinal history. In what follows, I will look at three categories of juror offence:
judicial, ministerial and quasi-ministerial. First, I will explore the limited evidence of judicial offences in nineteenth-and twentieth-century England. Given that the whole point of Bushell's Case was to protect jurors acting in their judicial capacity, it is unsurprising that the evidence here is sparse. But as the 2015 Act transforms quasi-judicial problems into offences cast in ministerial terms, it will be important to understand how this kind of transformation has been achieved in the past.
'Judicial' offences
In the sixteenth-and seventeenth-century cases concerning the 'ministerial' and 'judicial' functions of various administrative officers, 'judicial' functions were those which concerned the use of discretion. It should be noted that their confessions relate to a fire which they admitted causing accidentally. A Home Office minute suggested that this may help to explain the jury's verdict: 'It is possible that the jury not being properly versed in the common law doctrine of 'malice' may have come to the conclusion that though the lads set fire to the pavilion, they did not do so 'maliciously', or they may have thought that apparently it is still law that 'malice' cannot be presumed but must be proved affirmatively in the case of offender under 14, that benefit may be extended to youthful offenders over 14. ' It is not, then, altogether clear that jurors were very frequently punished for judicial offences (except to the extent that the partial disenfranchisement of persons deemed unsuitable for further service can be considered a punishment); although it was clearly common for judges to deliver their jurors a stern rebuke. Another possibility was that the jurors themselves might inadvertently bring their verdicts into disrepute, particularly by calling either for leniency or for a pardon. 96 Sometimes jurors were pressured into doing so by people connected to the defendant. 97 Particularly heavy pressure was exerted on the jury in a robbery case in 1827, where the defendants, convicted of a felony, potentially faced execution. The foreman of the jury, Joseph Dofsell, was visited by a friend of the prisoners, and asked to sign a petition stating the verdict was delivered against the evidence. When Dofsell refused, his visitor started shouting, and was therefore asked to leave. Dofsell was later called to a local pub for a meeting of the jurors, where the prisoners' friend induced the whole jury (including Dofsell) to sign.
When this case came before the Attorney and Solicitor General, they concluded that nothing could be done to prevent this sort of thing from happening: it was 'reprehensible yet as no personal violence was used and no such threats employed as would amount to intimidation … 95 Such rebukes also served to make clear that the problem was this particular juror or jury, rather than the jury system as a whole. There were also at this time, however, attacks on the civil jury system as a whole: C Hanly, 'The Decline of Civil Jury Trial in Nineteenth-Century England' (2005) 26 JLH 253. See also the nineteenthcentury French judicial attacks on the jury system Savitt, above n 22, 1029-1030. Although Savitt also notes that, despite judicial attacks on the lenience of French juries, it seems that the judiciary was no less lenient in practice: ibid, 1056-1060. 96 The sheer volume of such records on file at the National Archives suggest that such petitions were still a reasonably common part of the criminal process. The fact that specific legislation on the issue was even considered, and that no action was taken against the 1949 'juryman' because he was in fact 'a very kindly and respectable old lady' suggests a developing sense that, despite the relatively low numbers involved, a way had to be found to stop jurors bringing their verdicts into disrepute.
During the second half of the twentieth century, the general feeling that disclosure of deliberations should be avoided, and should not be taken into account in appeals, shifted to a specific argument that steps were needed to positively prevent disclosure. ) -jury offences were contained neither within the category of judicial corruption (s 111) nor within the category of ministerial corruption (s 112); rather, s 129 provided for an offence of 'corruptly influencing juries and witnesses', and thereby put the juror in a special category, being neither judicial nor ministerial in nature. 121 See in particular Langbein, above n 22, p 324 n 346 and Stern, above n 17, 1816; although see Whitman, above n 41, pp 177-178 arguing that if the argument was truly anachronistic it could not possibly have been as wellreceived as it was at the time.
sworn in in his set of ministerial offences. To the extent that embracery involved an attempt at influencing a jury's verdict after the jury had been sworn in, embracery must therefore fall at least within the spirit of Vaughan's ministerial offences.
Embracery, then, should be considered a quasi-ministerial offence, and its ambiguity within the classification of juror offences proposed in Bushell's Case also extends to the fact it was not only jurors who could be proceeded against for the offence. Both the jurors themselves and the people who had attempted to influence their verdicts (a feature of embracery which makes the offence also quasi-judicial in nature) could be prosecuted for the offence. Nonetheless, prosecutions were uncommon enough that even trials at the Old Bailey failed on procedural grounds. In January 1891, for example, one James Baker was indicted for embracery and perverting the course of justice, having attempted 'to incline the … jury to be more favourable … by persuasions, entertainments, and other unlawful means'. 122 Baker's counsel successfully argued the indictment was faulty, as embracery must relate to specific jurors rather than to 'a jury' generally. 123 This only delayed matters, however, as in March he was indicted again; and this time the indictment named the jurors. 124 They were examined at trial, and Baker was convicted; but it should be noted that, despite the impropriety of the jurors' actions in Baker's case, 125 there was no suggestion that they should also be indicted.
A year after James Baker's successful second trial for embracery at the Old Bailey, one James 125 Baker had taken several jurors out for drinks. It should, however, be noted that one of the jurors expressed regret at having met with the defendant: 'I had never heard of embracery before; I did not know I was embraced, and I am very sorry I was'. Ibid.
an adjournment, Asplin left the court in order to post a letter. The trial judge considered this 'a gross contempt of Court', which had exposed the whole jury to the danger of external 'influence'. 126 He fined Asplin £50 and discharged the jury. 127 Asplin was not prosecuted for embracery, but was instead convicted of contempt for exposing the jury to the risk of embracery. 128 The judge's reaction suggests he considered interference to be a danger to be protected against, and this is a danger which continued into the early decades of the twentieth century. But the onus generally seems to have been on embracers not to embrace, rather than on jurors not to be embraced, and there is no record of a juror being proceeded against for embracery during the period covered by this article until 1934. Asplin's contempt conviction was an unusual judicial response.
Even where there was clear evidence of embracery, the official response was more likely to be an increase in security than prosecutions. Following the reports of Accrington's and St Helens' Chief Constables, the Lord Chief Justice agreed that trial judges should be reminded that they did not have to let jurors separate (thereby exposing them to the danger of embracery): that the Juries Detention Act 1897 actually gave them discretion on this issue. 138 During the following few decades there was growing pressure to alter the law, and again this pressure consisted not of calls for more rigorous enforcement of the law concerning juror misconduct but, rather, consisted of calls for a stricter management of the space occupied by the jurors. Misconduct was to be managed away, but not prosecuted. In 1928, for example, when the Home Office considered extending the 1897 Act so as to allow the jurors to separate even when trying 'murder, treason and treason-felony', it was noted that the '[g]eneral view of the judges was against alteration of the law'. 139 In 1948, the law was finally altered so as to allow for separation in all cases. 140 What is notable in all this is that embracery was viewed as a problem to be managed, rather than as a criminal offence to be prosecuted. Juror punishment for embracery was technically possible, but practically speaking it seems rarely to have been used. 144 'Jury Foreman in Dock', above n 142. 145 Ibid. 146 The internal reference given in the precedent book shows it was bundled together with the 1963 file referred to below. 147 Home Office, above n 29, p 385.
men.' 148 The fact two of these records either define embracery or put it in inverted commas suggests the crime was not one which officials were used to dealing with as a criminal offence.
This makes the 1934 conviction of the foreman particularly important: what was so unusual about this case which meant a conviction was sought? There are two probable factors. First, the evidence here pointed to a clear link between the embracer and the embracee, in a way which must have been generally difficult to establish beyond reasonable doubt (and the Recorder explicitly alluded to this factor). Second, the fact Ramsey had instigated the offence by proposing a price of £50 clearly made this case more egregious than a previously innocent juror having been approached in a pub. Both of these factors must make Ramsey's imprisonment genuinely unusual.
It is well known that the creation of majority verdicts in 1967 was largely motivated by police concerns about the problem of corrupted jurors. there was insufficient evidence for a prosecution. 152 The police were, however, very concerned about the existing cost of protecting jurors from corruption: 'I think you already know that it takes the services of 72 police officers during each period of 24 hours to look after one team of jurymen'. 153 The choice, as far as the Metropolitan Police were concerned, seems to have been between preventing embracery at great expense, or ensuring a couple of bribed jurors could simply (and cheaply) be outvoted. Owing to the ambivalence inherent in Vaughan's explanation of the judicial-ministerial distinction as regards juror punishment, it is difficult to precisely identify embracery either as a judicial or as a ministerial offence. A juror guilty of embracery, it could be said, has committed a ministerial offence in the same way as the Pennsylvania jurors who cast lots rather than deliberate: she has acted in a way which undermines the jurors' ability to act judicially.
Any punishment meted out to such a juror will therefore refer to this failure in the nondiscretionary, ministerial, part of the juror's task, rather than the truly judicial task of honest deliberation. It is, nonetheless, clear that this kind of quasi-ministerial offence has very rarely resulted in jurors being tried and punished. This is so despite the fact that a juror being successfully embraced was no less a crime than a defendant attempting to embrace. Indeed, on several occasions juror punishment following embracery was seriously considered; and in 1933 159 Letter from AJE Brennan to JA Chilcot, 20 Dec 1966 (National Archives: HO 291/484). 160 Owen, above n 49. 161 Bribery Act 2010, s 17(1).
a foreman was convicted for being embraced. But despite the decision in 1825 to preserve the offence, embracery seems in general to have been considered a problem to be managed rather than an offence to be prosecuted.
'Ministerial' offences
There is little evidence of jurors in nineteenth-and twentieth-century England having been punished for judicial or quasi-ministerial offences. Even when jurors were punished for activities relating to a verdict, it was the act of publicising a verdict's flaws, rather than the fact the flaws existed, which was most likely to have been the problem. As it was in 1670, so too in 1870 or 1970: jurors could only be punished for ministerial offences. But ministerial offences have not only concerned the relatively dramatic problem of a juror disavowing her own verdict;
they have also concerned lesser matters such as a juror failing to attend because she never received her summons, or a juror leaving court in order to post a letter. Given that a rather large number of people called to serve must have acted in ways which might fall into this fairly broad category of ministerial offences, it will be important to try to understand who was and was not punished, and why. In this way, Vaughan's bare conceptual dichotomy of judicial and ministerial offences can be fleshed out with practical details. And by fleshing out the concepts, we might proceed a step or two closer to understanding the practices of juror punishment. The most common kind of ministerial offence in the period under discussion was a failure to respond to jury summonses, or a failure to attend on time. While there is evidence that it was considered acceptable to punish non-attending jurors in some circumstances, the picture was still reasonably equivocal. When, in 1866, the Treasury Solicitor was asked when he would exercise his discretion to remit such fines, he explained he would only do so extraordinarily.
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This was still the case almost a century later when, in 1952, the Treasury Solicitor ruled that a soldier stationed in Germany and a man who had not received his summons on account of having moved house each had sufficiently exceptional excuses for their fines to be waived. Esther Roper refused to serve due to conscientious objections to participating in criminal punishment; and while their decision was attacked in the press, there is no evidence that they were formally punished. 190 But judicial resistance to punishing these jurors was not only a reflection of unease about having female jurors: a Home Office book reports in 1928 a 'Juryman with "conscientious obj" to serving who threatens to disagree with verdict of others whatever it might be. Told that such action would be a criminal offence'. 191 Contemporaneous press reports reveal that he was not actually punished due to his name not being selected, 192 however, making it impossible to tell whether this was simply a rhetorical threat, or whether the trial judge intended to follow it through. Either way, it is clear that the threat of fines for ministerial offences was still considered legitimate.
So how frequently were jurors punished for the straightforward ministerial offences of failing to attend court, or of refusing to serve? The first thing to note is that those cases which are preserved at the National Archives or were reported by the press are by definition unusual: if they were ordinary, uncontroversial cases, they would presumably have been resolved locally.
It is therefore not unreasonable to conclude that more jurors must have been fined for nonattendance than those which survive in governmental records. This, in itself, suggests that punishment was considered acceptable for ordinary ministerial offences. There is, on the other hand, the claim of the early twentieth-century judge that London judges treated non-attendance pragmatically, in practice letting absentee jurors off without penalty, while simultaneously taking care to avoid advertising this fact. The evidence of local newspapers suggests that provincial courts took a similar approach, certainly by the early twentieth century. What we do know is that the practice of punishing jurors for ministerial offences was considered a legitimate way of governing jurors. At no point did the Treasury resolve that jurors should not be fined: they always restricted themselves to the question whether this fine, in these circumstances, should be remitted. Punishment for ministerial offences, then, operated as a normal part of jury management.
Conclusions
The provisions of the Criminal Justice and Courts Act 2015 which create indictable offences of misconduct by a criminal trial juror are probably unprecedented in the modern history of English law. By moving away from contempt and into jury trial for quasi-judicial misconduct, the new provisions draw a sharp line between juror punishment pre-and post-2015. It is, however, possible to piece together a picture of how juror punishment has operated in the recent past; and it is important that this is in fact done, in order to gain a greater sense of the significance of the new offences. What has emerged here, in pulling together archival evidence, is a general resistance to the idea of juror punishment where jurors have acted in their judicial, rather than in their ministerial, capacity. But in practice the judicial-ministerial divide has acted more like a continuum than a hard distinction: the closer you are to the judicial end of the spectrum, the less likely it has been that a juror will be punished; and offences closer to being straightforwardly ministerial have been much more likely to result in punishment. Even here,
however, there appears to have been a significant degree of prosecutorial discretion.
Even in the wholly ministerial category of offences, there is a lack of clarity about when jurors were and were not proceeded against. This is, to some extent, a consequence of the fragmentary nature of the surviving records: because juror punishment has not previously been considered a particularly important or controversial topic, files have not been bundled together, and many were therefore not subject to the same level of judicial control as were summary contempt cases, there appears to have been a general reluctance to institute proceedings against jurors, as opposed to the people accused of embracing or perverting them. The nineteenth-century debates about whether the press or the judiciary were better placed to rebuke jurors felt to have exercised their judgment improperly hint at a possible explanation: that the strictly judicial aspect of the judge-jury relationship is ultimately rooted in an idea of the judge as tutor, rather than as disciplinarian. Despite the new statutory offences' stated aim of sending out a clear message that juror misconduct is wrong, and will be dealt with seriously, this means juror misconduct will probably be dealt with in most cases through practices designed to manage away the problem, as was seen for example in the discussion of embracery above; and of course ministerial offences will still be dealt with summarily. Juror punishment can, therefore, be expected to carry on in much the same way as it did throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. And if this is so then the future of juror misconduct is unlikely to be radically different from its recent past.
